Eugene Vaynberg · 2024 · Synthese
Paper
Abstract A number of philosophers claim that realism about dark matter in cosmology is unwarranted because there has been no empirical confirmation of a dark matter particle. This demand is misguided. I argue that we should take the theoretical concept of dark matter as described in our best cosmological model (ΛCDM) at face value. Since there is no theoretical or nomological requirement that dark matter be a particle, we should better assess the implications of dark matter detection via gravitational lensing. The result is that realism about dark matter is a viable position.
Analysis
This paper argues that realism about dark matter is a viable position, challenging the philosophical demand for empirical confirmation of a dark matter particle and suggesting assessment via gravitational lensing.
Discovery
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